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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE 
Jurisdiction of this case is proper under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2 (4) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the District Court property grant Appellee's 
Motion for Summary Judgment where Appellant failed to provide any 
support for his claim that the Krugerrands were a gift to him? 
2. Did the District Court properly grant Appellee's 
Motion for Summary Judgment where Appellant failed to provide 
support for his claim that he was entitled to deduct from rents due 
repairs he claimed to be making on a duplex rented to him? 
3. Did the trial court judge abuse her discretion in 
denying Appellant's motion to amend his Answer to plead the 
affirmative defense of statute of limitations? 
4. Did the trial court judge abused her discretion in 
denying Appellant's Motion for a jury or advisory jury? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, testimony, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue 
of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. Utah Rule Civ. Pro. 56(c) . Where no 
material facts remain unresolved, the Appeals Court will examine 
the trial court's conclusions of law and review them for 
correctness. Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
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The standard o± review of a denial to amend pleadings is 
abuse of discretion. Granting or denying leave to amend a pleading 
is within the broad discretion of the trial court and an appeals 
court will not disturb such a ruling absent a showing of an abuse 
of discretion. Girard v. Appelby. 660 P.2d 245 (1983). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 12(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 38(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an appeal from the lower court's ruling that 
David Cahoon, the Appellant, had converted 159 gold Krugerrand 
coins belonging to Glen Cahoon and had failed to pay rents due on 
a duplex rented to him. 
A* Course of Proceedings 
1. On September 23, 1991, Marion Cahoon filed a 
Petition for Guardianship of her husband Glen Cahoon. 
2. On October 14, 1991, David Cahoon, Glen 
Cahoon's son from a prior marriage, filed an objection to Marion 
Cahoon's petition for guardianship. 
3. On December 11, 1991, a hearing was held before 
the Honorable Homer Wilkinson at which time Glen Cahoon, Marion 
Cahoon and David Cahoon all testified. Judge Wilkinson held that 
while Glen Cahoon was competent to testify he needed assistance to 
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protect his interests, and appointed Marion Cahoon as his guardian. 
Record at 583. 
4. Based upon the testimony at the guardianship 
hearing, Marion Cahoon filed a complaint against David Cahoon for 
the conversion of 159 gold Krugerrand coins and for the non-payment 
of rent on property (hereinafter referred to as the "Duplex") which 
Glen Cahoon owned and rented to David Cahoon. Record at 2-6. 
5. On February 14, 1992, David Cahoon filed his 
answer and a counterclaim which is not part of this appeal. Record 
at 27-29. 
6. On April 15, 1992, Marion Cahoon filed a motion 
to consolidate for purposes of discovery and taking of evidence, so 
that the evidence and testimony taken in the guardianship hearing 
on December 11, 1991 would be made part of the civil action record. 
The motion was granted on May 13, 1992. Record at 38-40 and 47. 
7. On July 30, 1992, Marion Cahoon filed a motion 
for summary judgment based in large part upon the testimony taken 
at the December 11, 1991 hearing before Judge Wilkinson. The 
motion for summary judgment was set for hearing on October 21, 1992 
and then rescheduled for on November 13. Record at 53-54 and 142-
144. 
8. On October 29, 1992, David Cahoon filed a 
motion to amend his answer to the complaint to include a statute of 
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limitations defense. No arguments or memorandum in support of this 
motion were filed. Record at 150. 
9. On November 13, 1992, a hearing was held before 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis on the Appellee's motion for summary 
judgment. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted 
Marion Cahoon's motion for summary judgment with respect to the 
back rent and took under advisement the conversation of the 
Krugerrands. Record at 163. 
10. On December 2, 1992, the court ruled that David 
Cahoon had failed to carry his burden of proof that the Krugerrand 
coins were a gift to him and that he had converted the coins. The 
court also ruled that the number of coins converted was at issue 
and scheduled an evidentiary hearing to take testimony with regard 
to the number of coins converted. Record at 197, 247-252. 
11. On December 10, 1992 the court entered an order 
denying David Cahoon's motion to amend his answer to include a 
statute of limitations defense. Record at 202. 
12. On December 24, 1992, David Cahoon filed a 
motion requesting a jury trial or an advisory jury. Record at 242. 
13. On December 30, 1992, a hearing was held before 
Judge Leslie Lewis on David Cahoon's request for a jury trial and 
his objections to findings of fact and conclusions of law from the 
November 13 hearing. At that time, the court entered modified 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, denied defendant's request 
for a jury trial and scheduled the hearing to take evidence on the 
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number and value of Krugerrands for February 11, 1993. Record at 
246-251. 
14. On February 11, 1993, the evidentiary hearing 
regarding the number and value of the converted Krugerrands began. 
The hearing continued to February 24, 1993. The court found that 
the defendant had converted 159 Krugerrands and ordered him to 
return the Krugerrands or to pay the plaintiff their value 
determined to be $73,580.22 plus statutory interest. Record at 
272-280. 
B. Disposition in the Court Below 
The trial court, based upon the testimony at the 
evidentiary hearing before Judge Wilkinson and the hearing on the 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and David Cahoon's failure to support 
his claims of a gift, granted summary judgment with regard to the 
conversion of the Krugerrand coins, and the non-payment of rents on 
the Duplex. The trial court held another evidentiary hearing to 
determine the issue of the number of coins and their value at which 
time both Appellee and Appellant submitted additional evidence. 
After testimony and argument from both parties, the trial court 
found that the number of coins converted was 159 coins (the 
Appellee having returned seven coins) and that the value of the 
converted coins was $73,580.22 plus statutory interest from the 
date of conversion. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In May, 1979, Glen Cahoon purchased 166 gold 
Krugerrand coins. Record at 56, 62, 558. 
2. In December, 1979, Glen Cahoon delivered possession 
of the coins to his son David Cahoon and instructed David to bury 
the coins underneath the Duplex owned by Glen Cahoon and rented to 
David Cahoon. Record at 57-60, 530-531, 570, 574. 
3. On December 3, 1979, Glen Cahoon married Marion 
Cahoon. 
4. In approximately 1981, David Cahoon, without Glen 
Cahoon's knowledge or consent, dug up the coins (Record at 62-65, 
70-71, 572-574) and used them for his own needs. Record at 62-65, 
70-71, 574-575. 
5. In January, 1985, Glen Cahoon informed Marion 
Cahoon, his wife, of the coins buried under the Duplex. Record at 
60-62, 547, 550. 
6. On September 23, 1991, Marion Cahoon petitioned for 
appointment as guardian of Glen B. Cahoon. On October 14, 1991, 
David Cahoon filed an objection to Marion Cahoon's appointment. On 
December 11, 1991 a hearing was held before Judge Wilkinson at 
which time Glen Cahoon testified that all of the Krugerrands were 
buried under the Duplex in three five gallon plastic boxes. Record 
at 58, 530-531. Glen also testified that he had not given the 
Krugerrands to David. Record at 59, 531. Glen testified that he 
believed that the Krugerrands were still buried underneath the 
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Duplex and that he was saving them for his old age. Record at 59, 
531, 534. David Cahoon testified that he buried the Krugerrands 
under the Duplex at his father's instruction and he subsequently 
dug them up and used them for his own purposes. Record at 62-65, 
570. David claimed that the coins were given to him as a gift. 
Record at 65, 574. 
7. On December 11, 1991, Judge Wilkinson found 
that Glen Cahoon was competent to give testimony but needed a 
conservator/guardian to protect his interests and appointed Marion 
Cahoon as his guardian/conservator. Record at 583. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The district court was correct in granting Marion 
Cahoon's motion for summary judgment with respect to the question 
of a gift where the uncontradicted evidence and testimony of the 
donor, Glen Cahoon was that no gift was intended. Record at 59, 
531. There was no testimony by David Cahoon which would support 
his claim that the coins were a "gift" to him. David testified 
that he was instructed by Glen Cahoon to "hold these". Record at 
64, 574. 
2. The district court was correct in granting Marion 
Cahoon's motion for summary judgment with respect to the rents due 
on the Duplex because David Cahoon failed, prior to the hearing on 
the motion for summary judgment, to produce any evidence or support 
for his claim that he was entitled to make improvements or repairs 
to the property and offset his rents due against such improvement 
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or repairs without the prior approval of Glen Cahoon or the 
Conservator. The only evidence before the Court was that David 
Cahoon had not paid the rents due and neither Glen Cahoon nor 
Marion Cahoon had authorized him to make improvements or repairs. 
Record at 78-79. 
3. The district court's denial of Appellant's motion to 
amend his complaint to include a statute of limitations defense was 
not an abuse of discretion where the motion was filed after the 
motion for summary judgment had been filed and just days before the 
hearing on the motion for summary judgment. The Appellant did not 
file a proposed amended answer nor did Appellant present any 
testimony or any evidence in support of his motion to amend. All 
of the facts which were before the court were known to the 
Appellant for eight months prior to the hearing date. Further, 
based upon the evidence before the trial court, it was unlikely 
that the statute of limitations defense could be successfully 
argued where the protected person and guardian both believed that 
Appellant, David Cahoon still had possession of the coins and did 
not discover that he had converted them to his own use until the 
December 11, 1991 guardianship hearing. Record at 59, 531, 575, 
578. Upon discovering that David Cahoon had converted the 
Krugerrands to his own use, the guardian promptly instituted this 
action for conversion. 
4. The district court under Rule 38(d) properly denied 
Appellant's motion for a jury trial on an advisory jury where the 
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motion was not made until after the court had already ruled on 
several of the primary issues and had scheduled a hearing date to 
try the issue of the number of coins and their value, which is 
tantamount to asking for a jury in the middle of the trial. 
5. Appellant has failed to marshall the evidence based 
upon the record below and attempted to support his appeal by citing 
evidence which is not a part of the record below and was not before 
the trial court. Throughout his brief the Appellant cites as facts 
deposition testimony of Marion Cahoon which is not a part of the 
record below nor was it part of the testimony before the trial 
court. He states as fact findings of the court which are contrary 
to the record. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT BECAUSE APPELLANT FAILED TO PRODUCE 
EVIDENCE THAT RAISED A GENUINE ISSUE OF 
MATERIAL FACT. 
The uncontroverted evidence before the court was that 
Glen Cahoon had purchased the gold coins and hid them away for his 
old age. Record at 59-60, 531, 534, 550. When asked if he had 
given the Krugerrands to David Cahoon, he answered "No, I did not 
give them to David. They belong to me. And anytime I need them I 
can get them. If I need them I can go over and get them." Record 
at 59, 531. 
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When David Cahoon testified with regard to his claim that 
the coins were given to him, there was no testimony given which 
would support a clear and unequivocal gift. He testified "They 
were given to me. He (Glen) said 'Hold these' and I did." Record 
at 64, 574. In addition, when pressed the following exchange took 
place: 
Q Let's define "give them". He gave possession of 
them to you, but did he give title of them to you? 
Did he give you title to the coins? Did he make a 
gift to you? Isn't that what you told me that they 
were yours? 
A Well there wasn't any dispute, you know. I didn't 
give him a receipt, he didn't give me any condition 
of sale or any kind of thing. There were no papers 
exchanged. All there was was the goods were handed 
to me. 
Q Any instructions? Did your father tell you to bury 
them? 
A Right. And that's what I did. 
Id. 
This exchange clearly indicates that there was no clear 
and unequivocal expression of a gift. 
Under Utah law a donee has a burden of proving an inter 
vivos gift by "clear and convincing evidence." Sims v. George, 466 
P.2d 831, 835 (1970) ("one so claiming a gift from another must 
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence"). In this case, 
where the donor was still alive and testifies that no gift was made 
or intended and the donee does not present any testimony or other 
evidence of the intent to make a present gift, the trial court was 
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correct in granting summary judgment as a matter of law. It is 
plain that the Appellant has failed to meet his burden under rule 
56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to produce evidence that 
raises any genuine issue of material fact. Rule 56(e) is quite 
clear concerning this burden: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule an adverse 
party may not rest upon its mere allegations 
or denials of his pleadings but his response, 
by affidavits or otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If 
he does not so response, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(e). 
This rule is also explicit that "opposing affidavits 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein." These 
requirements are well recognized and emphasize in Utah decisions. 
See A.P. Winter v. Northwest Pipeline Corporation, 820 P.2d 916, 
919 (Utah 1991) ("allegations of a pleading or factual conclusion 
of an affidavit are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact."); Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 415 (Utah 1990) 
("bear allegations unsupported by any facts are not sufficient to 
withstand a motion for summary judgment"); Massey v. Utah Power & 
Light, 609 P.2d 937 (Utah 1980) (same). 
Appellant's response to Appellee's motion for summary 
judgment failed to meet these standards. Despite Appellee's 
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memorandum of law and supporting affidavits (Record at 55-80), 
Appellant produced no affidavit or other evidence that raised any 
issue of material fact. All that Appellant can marshall to oppose 
the facts established by Appellee are unsupported allegations. 
The court properly granted summary judgment with respect 
to the unpaid back rents because David Cahoon failed to support his 
claim that he was entitled to make improvements or repairs to the 
Duplex and deduct the cost of those repairs including his time 
which he charged at $10 an hour against rents due. These repair 
charges were not authorized by Glen Cahoon or Marion Cahoon after 
she was appointed guardian. Record at 78-79. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
WHERE IT REFUSED TO ALLOW AN AMENDMENT OF THE 
PLEADINGS WHEN NOTHING NEW OR OF SUBSTANCE WAS 
CONTAINED IN THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT. 
Appellant's motion to amend his answer to the complaint 
to include a statute of limitations defense was a two-sentence 
motion without any supporting affidavits, memoranda, law or 
testimony nor did the Appellant submit a copy of the proposed 
amended answer with the motion. Record at 150. Appellant does not 
cite to any deposition or other testimony to prove his point nor 
does he cite any case law to support the proposition that he should 
be allowed to amend his answer. Under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, David Cahoon had already waived his opportunity to 
assert such a defense. Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
states as follows: 
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(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a 
proceeding pleading a party may set forth 
affirmative accord and satisfaction, arbitra-
tion and award, assumption of risk, contribu-
tory negligence, discharged in bankruptcy, 
duress, estoppel, failure of consideration," 
fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servants, 
laches, license, payment, release, res 
judicata, statute of frauds, statute of 
limitations, waiver, and any other matter 
constituting an avoidance for affirmative 
defense. 
If a party does not assert such defenses then they are deemed 
waived under Rule 12(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
states: 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all 
defenses and objections which he does not 
present either by motion as hereinbefore 
provided or, if he has made no motion, in his 
answer or reply. 
In this case Appellant was aware of all of the evidence 
which would allow him to plead a statute of limitations defense 
eight months before the filing of his motion. In his brief, 
Appellant argues that the statute of limitations began to run in 
1985 when Marion Cahoon was told by her husband Glen that he had 
buried $48,000 worth of gold Krugerrands under the Duplex. 
Appellant's Brief p. 21-22. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(5) provides: 
" . . . that the cause of action does not accrue until the aggrieved 
party knows or reasonably should have known of harm suffered." 
Under this statute, an aggrieved party must know of the facts 
giving rise to the claim before the statute of limitation begins to 
run. In this case, Marion Cahoon and Glen Cahoon both believed 
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that the gold Krugerrands were still buried underneath the Duplex. 
Record at 59-60, 531. It was not until David Cahoon testified that 
he had dug the Krugerrands up and had begun spending them that they 
discovered that a conversion had taken place. Record at 64-65, 
574-575. This evidence was presented at the hearing on December 
11, 1991, before Judge Wilkinson. Prior to that date, neither Glen 
Cahoon nor Marion Cahoon had any knowledge of David Cahoon7s 
wrongful acts. Based upon this evidence which was before the trial 
Court and David Cahoon's failure to support his motion to amend, 
the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's 
motion. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A JURY 
TRIAL. 
Appellant David Cahoon filed his answer to Appellee's 
complaint on February 11, 1992. Appellant did not request a jury 
trial in that pleading and accordingly did not pay the statutory 
jury fee. On November 13, 1992, Marion Cahoon's motion for summary 
judgment on all issues was heard by the court. At that time the 
court could have decided all the issues raised by this case. Even 
though the court could have ruled as to all issues, defendant still 
did not file a jury demand and still had not paid any requisite 
jury fee. 
On December 2, 1992, the court entered its order which, 
along with the court's previous ruling, decided the entire case 
except for determining the value and number of the Krugerrands 
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converted by the defendant. A hearing was set to hear the evidence 
on that issue. 
On December 24, 1992, more than ten months after 
defendant filed his answer and less than one week before the 
scheduled hearing on the final issue, defendant requested a jury 
trial by way of a one sentence pleading filed with the court. 
Record at 242. 
Rule 38(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states: 
Any party may demand a trial by jury of any 
issue triable of right of a jury by paying the 
statutory jury fee and serving upon the other 
parties a demand therefor in writing at any 
time after the commencement of the action but 
not later than ten days after the service of 
the last pleading directed to such issue. 
Such demand may be endorsed upon a pleading of 
the party. 
Under Rule 38(b), defendant was required to pay the 
statutory jury fee of $50.00 and serve upon plaintiff a jury demand 
not later than ten days after the service of defendant's answer 
which occurred on February 11, 1992. Therefore, defendant had not 
complied with Rule 38(b). By not complying with Rule 38(b), the 
defendant is subject to Rule 38(d) which states, "The failure of a 
party to pay the statutory fee, to serve the demand as required by 
this rule and to file it as required by Rule 5 (d) constitutes a 
waiver by him of trial by jury." 
Pursuant to the applicable rules, Appellant waived his 
right to a trial by jury and his motion was properly denied by the 
trial court. 
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The Appellant's one-sentence request for a jury trial 
also appears to offer the Court the alternative of providing an 
advisory jury for the purpose of ruling on the one remaining issue 
in this matter. Because Appellant chose not to provide any 
citations to his motion, Appellee must assume that the type of 
advisory jury which Appellant refers is provided in Rule 39(c), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which states: "In all actions not 
triable of right by a jury, the court upon motion or of its own 
initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury or the consent 
of both parties, may order a trial with a jury whose verdict has 
the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of right." 
Under the rule, an advisory jury may be utilized in 
actions not triable of right by jury. In this case, the remaining 
issue is one which was triable by right so long as Appellant had 
properly complied with the applicable rule. See Rule 38, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Advisory juries are generally used to 
advise on questions of equity which are not triable by right. 
There was no equitable issue outstanding. See e.g., Romrell v. 
Zions First National Bank, 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980) . If a jury may 
properly sit in a case, as in this case if the defendant had 
complied with the applicable rules, there is no need for an 
advisory jury. 
In sum, the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in 
refusing to grant Appellant's motion for a jury trial. The motion 
was made long after the evidence was presented to the court, the 
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court had ruled on several of the issues and the court had 
scheduled a hearing ten days hence to consider the final issues. 
IV. APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE 
BASED UPON THE RECORD BELOW AND MADE 
ASSERTIONS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Throughout his brief Appellant cites portions of Marion 
Cahoon's deposition which were not a part of the pleadings, were 
not before the trial court, and were not made a part of the record 
below. See Appellant's Brief at page 4, Statement of Facts, 
In addition, Appellant states as fact that the Court 
found Glen Cahoon incompetent when in fact the Court found Glen 
Cahoon incapacitated but competent to give testimony and that he 
was able to give truthful answers and understood the questions. 
Record at 583. 
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 11(a)(2), 
provides that if Appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding 
or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence 
Appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence 
relevant to such finding or conclusion. In essence, Rule 11 
directs the appellant to provide the Appeals Court with all 
evidence relevant to the issues raised on appeal. Where the record 
before the Court of Appeals is incomplete, the Court is unable to 
review the evidence as a whole and must therefore presume that the 
verdict was supported by admissible and competent evidence. 
Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998 (Utah Ct. App.). 
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There is ample support in the record before the trial 
court which includes the pleadings, affidavits and the testimony at 
the hearings to support the Judge's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. Nowhere in Appellant's brief does he 
demonstrate that the evidence in the record below does not support 
the Court's findings and conclusions. Appellant merely argues that 
his testimony should have been more credible to the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the trial court's granting 
summary judgment with respect to Appellant's claim of a gift of the 
Krugerrand coins to him and the non-payment of rent due, was proper 
as no issue of disputed material fact was produced by the Appellant 
in support of such claim. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
plaintiff's motion to amend since such motion which, even if 
granted, would not have materially changed the result. Appellant's 
motion for a jury trial was properly denied in that Appellant 
failed to comply with statutory requirements and request a jury 
trial in a timely fashion. 
DATED this ID day of November, 1994. 
KE&JJf B. ALDE 
J . MICHAEL BAILEY 
JOHN E. DIAZ 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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